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ABSTRACT 1
Transport user benefits are of great importance in cost benefit analysis when appraising transport projects. 2
Generally they have the greatest impact on the results of cost-benefit analyses. It is common to adopt the 3 consumer surplus for calculating transport user benefits. The consumer surplus measure is based on the 4 underlying demand model and follows from the integration of the demand curve. If the popular logit 5 model is used for forecasting travel demand, consumer surplus measure takes a closed form (the 6 "logsum") that is easy to calculate. Furthermore, in cost-benefit analyses the change in consumer surplus 7 between an initial and final state is needed, which can be easily derived by the difference of the logsums 8 of the two states. This logsum approach is proven and correct for travel demand models based on the logit 9 model without multiple constraints. However, for travel demand models dealing with two or more sets of 10 constraints the logsum approach fails. 11
In this paper we describe a mathematical approach for a transport user benefits measure that corresponds 12 to the consumer surplus and is universal for all travel demand models with constraints. We exemplarily 13 derive the measure for a doubly constrained trip distribution. The applicability of the derived approach is 14
shown by a small example. 15
INTRODUCTION 1
Transport investments and policies are often associated with high investment costs for society and cost 2 changes for transport users, which might lead to welfare changes. It is therefore essential to anticipate 3 welfare impacts ex ante and give decision makers robust decision support. There are different concepts 4 for evaluating projects and policies; however, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is normally the method of 5 choice. 6
Generally, in transport project and policy appraisals, transport user benefits have (in addition to 7 investment costs) the most impact on welfare changes. User benefits result from the changes of user costs 8 such as travel time and travel cost between the "initial state" (the most likely transport situation over the 9 course of the appraisal period if no intervention were to occur) and the "final state" (the initial state with 10 transport intervention). Economic theory -as the theoretical basis of the CBA -provides the concept of 11 the (change in) consumer surplus for the calculation of the transport user benefits. This measure can be 12 derived by the mathematical integral of the demand function (see, for example, Varian, 1992). 13 Accordingly, there is a direct link between user benefits, costs, and travel demand changes. The applied 14 method of integrating the travel demand function defines the accuracy of the resulting user benefits. The 15 standard approach in practice is the so called "Rule of a Half" (RoH). It has been widely used in project 16 investments and policy analysis since its first introduction in the 1960s (Williams, 1977) . The concept 17 assumes a linear path between the user costs in the initial and final state, whereas the real shape of the 18 underlying demand function is neglected. For this reason, the RoH only provides a precise benefit 19 measure for small user cost changes and only if the demand curve is nearly a straight line, otherwise it can 20 be only considered as a rough approximation (De Jong et al. 2007 ). 21 Demand curves of travel demand models are generally not straight lines, and the RoH often provides 22 inexact transport user benefits. However, there are other approaches to obtain more precise results. In 23 particular, the antiderivative of the applied travel demand function could be used for calculating a 24 mathematical exact consumer surplus. This approach presupposes that the antiderivative is known. If that 25 is the case, direct integration is possible and would be the best solution. 26
The widely used multinomial logit model (MNL) provides the antiderivative that is called "logsum term" 27 (or short "logsum"). The MNL is based on the concept of random utility maximization and was 28 microeconomically derived by McFadden (1981) . In context of project evaluation, the consumer surplus 29 of the initial and final states can be provided by logsums. Hence, the change in consumer surplus is 30 calculated as the logsum difference. 31
The logsum approach is a theoretically well-founded and easily calculable method for providing transport 32 user benefits. It is applied by more and more researchers and transportation planners (Zhao et al., 2012) . 33
However, it strongly depends on the use of the MNL (or nested logit) as the underlying travel demand 34 function. There are many travel demand models applied in research and practice that are not apparently 35 congruent to the MNL. This is especially the case for travel demand models with constraints. These 36 models are traditionally used for trip distribution and regard origin and destination constraints, which 37 ensure that given total numbers of trips produced in and attracted to each traffic zone equal resulting 38 numbers of trips. If such a model is used for calculating trip distribution, the logsum approach fails and as 39 a rule transport user benefits are approximated by the RoH. 40
In this paper we want to transfer the logsum approach for these widely used constrained travel demand 41 models and provide a mathematical exact transport user benefit measure for these models. For this 42 purpose an adjustment of the logsum difference is necessary. We will carry out the analysis by the EVA 43 model (Vrtic et al., 2007) as a representative of constrained models, which is characterized by different 44 constraint types. For this reason the paper first introduces travel demand models with constraints, in 45 particular the EVA model and its "logit version". It then goes on with benefit measures and problems of 46 the logsum difference approach with constraint models. After that, the mathematical adjustment of the 47 logsum approach follows. Then, a short and very simple example will serve as an illustration of the 1 approach. Finally, a summery is provided. It has to be noted that the main aim of the paper is to provide a 2 theoretical derivation of an adjusted logsum approach for travel demand models with constraints rather 3 than to show specific applications and comparisons. These questions will be discussed in the future. 4
TRAVEL DEMAND MODELS WITH CONSTRAINTS 5
There are lots of different concepts and approaches for modelling travel demand, and the well-known 4-6 step-algorithm is of particular importance. These steps can be calculated successively or partly combined, 7 whereby a combination of trip distribution and mode choice is most common. Here we focus on this 8 approach and give models with constraints special attention. 9
Traditionally, constraints are used for trip distribution. The best-known model is the doubly constrained 10 gravity model (see Wilson, 1967) , which satisfies the given total numbers of trips originating in and 11 attracted to a travel zone. The total numbers of trips are results of trip generation and input variables of 12 trip distribution. 13 Since it is not possible to show all facets, in the following the model specification with a set of inelastic 30 constraints for the origins and a set of elastic constraints for the destinations will be used. The doubly 31 constrained model is then: 32 demonstrated it for doubly constrained gravity models which exclusively consider inelastic constraints. 36
EVA Model
Here we apply the approach for the EVA model with different sets of constraints. 37
Starting point is the well-known MNL. This model is grounded on the economic concept of random 38 utility maximization (RUM) and the individuals are assumed to choose the most beneficial (optimal) 39 alternative (McFadden, 1981) . Unlike the constrained models, the MNL respects per se a maximum of 40 one set of constraints (singly constrained model) and calculates probabilities for the discrete alternatives 41
and not the trips directly. These are definable by multiplying the probabilities with the total number of 42 trips (total demand). 43
The comparison of alternatives is on the basis of the alternative specific utilities. Therefore utility 44 functions including decision-relevant variables have to be defined. In addition, the utility is decomposed 45 into an observed and an unobserved (random) component. The reason is that not all decision-relevant 46 factors are observable for researchers. The utility that a single decision maker or representative of a 1 homogenous group obtains from alternative ij can be described by (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985): 2 ij ij ij For defining the EVA MNL, the observable part of utility is the central element. Again, we show the case 15 with inelastic origin and elastic destination constraints, but other cases can be easily defined as well. 16
Firstly, the utility function is defined by the observable alternative specific attributes (negative) 17 generalized costs and destination utilities. In addition we include origin and destination shadow prices 18 (Neuburger and Wilcox, 1976). The term "shadow" is used, since these "prices" are not definable a priori 19 but derivable from the balancing factors of the EVA model a posteriori (after the iteration process). The 20 given numbers of originating and attracting trips contain additional information about the underlying 21 decision process of transport users. This information is implemented in the utility function by the shadow 22 prices, which serve the emendation of the "a priori utility". Then, by means of the shadow prices, the 23 utility maximization process provides the probabilities of alternatives producing a result with satisfied 24 constraints. The utility function can then be written: 25
with 27 θ i , τ j shadow prices of origin i and destination j 28 z j observable destination utility 29
By implementing this utility function in the MNL we get the EVA MNL for estimating trips T ij : 30
The EVA MNL is in fact a doubly constrained MNL and defined by this equation, although shadow 1 prices are unknown. However, it can be shown that shadow prices are easily derivable from the EVA 2 model by mathematical redrafts as follows (Winkler, 2015) :
Hence, the derivation of the shadow prices is straightforward by logarithmic transformations of the 5 balancing factors. The same applies to destination utilities that are defined by logarithmic transformation 6 of the destination attractors. 7
LOGSUM DIFFERENCE AND ITS FAILURE IN CASE OF CONSTRAINED MODELS 8
Measuring transport user benefits is often necessary for evaluation transport investments and policies by 9 CBA. For this purpose the concept of change in consumer surplus is often used. When applying an MNL 10 for estimating change in travel demand, change in consumer surplus can be easily derived by the logsum 11 difference. It is a simple mathematical formula and consistent with microeconomics. The logsum 12 difference as a measure for change in consumer surplus has been investigated and used in transport for 13 some time (see, for a comprehensive literature synthesis, Ma et al., 2015) . 14 For deriving the change in consumer surplus on the base of MNL, expected maximum utility of a decision 15 maker or representative has to be defined and it is: 16
where C is an unknown constant that represents that the absolute level of utility is not measurable. This 
∑∑
is called "logsum", which is simply the log of the denominator. However, for 21 evaluating transport investments and policies we are more interested in change in utility that is defined by 22 the difference between initial (0) and final (1) state conditions. For this purpose a difference in logsum 23 terms is applied: 24
The unknown constant C enters expected maximum utility both before and after change and drops out. On 26 the basis of this change in expected maximum utility, the required change in consumer surplus can be 27 derived, which is the monetized equivalent. Hence we get the change in consumer surplus by normalizing 28 the logsum difference by the marginal utility of income λ (of a representative traveler of a homogenous 29 group): 30
This normalization presumes that λ is constant and income effect is not accounted for (see, for example, 32 Williams, 1977 and Small and Rosen, 1981 In the present analysis we suppose a constant marginal utility of income, which, however, has to be 6 defined. Usually, a price or cost variable c enters the indirect utility V and the negative of its coefficient 7 β c is λ per definition (Train, 2003) . The derived change in consumer surplus applies for a representative 8
traveler. It can be interpreted as the average consumer surplus in the group under consideration. The 9 change in total consumer surplus (sum over all travelers of the group) can then be calculated by 10 multiplying the monetized logsum difference by total demand and it is: 11 
From this it follows that, regardless of the changes of generalized costs, the logsum difference provides 23 no (or incorrect) benefits. However, due to cost decreases, transport users in fact receive real benefit. 24 Therefore, the logsum difference obviously fails for constrained models. 25
There is only a little literature concerning this question. Williams (1976) and later Martinez and Araya 26 (2000) showed approaches for deriving transport user benefit measure on the basis of doubly constrained 27 gravity models. These derivations are based on the maximum entropy model and it is not easily 28 transferable to other models. Furthermore, a rigorous relationship between the transport user benefit 29 measure within the entropy framework and the logsum benefit measure within random utility theory has 30 not been established so far (Geurs et al., 2010) . Here we will close the gap and show a universal approach, 31 which adjusts the logsum difference to multiple-constrained models. 32
ADJUSTMENT OF THE LOGSUM DIFFERENCE 33
We have shown that the logsum difference fails for the EVA MNL. For distinguishing the real change in 34 expected maximum utility Here V is a vector of all alternative-specific deterministic utilities, since the probabilities depend on all 8 alternatives. Hence it can be written: 9 ( ) ( )
This integral is a line integral and its solution depends on the path C between the final and initial state. 11
Due to the fact that the antiderivative of the MNL, and hence of the EVA MNL, is known, a path 12 independent solution of equation (16) formulae. However, all integrals can only be solved one by one with respect to the considered changing 28 variable (g, z etc.) while all other components have to be constant. It has to be taken into account that 1 benefit contributions of different variables depend on the sequence of integrations (path dependency). 2 Hence, singly benefit contributions cannot be defined unambiguously, but the sum over all is independent. 3
The requested change in expected maximum utility is only a function of real and observable changing 4 attributes between the initial and final state (Williams, 1976) . In the present analysis these are generalized 5 costs g and destination utilities z and it is: 6 ( )
Now we can reformulate equation (21) one-dimensional because their differentials only have one dimension (I or j). Since a change in θ i has no 13 influence on probability of destination (same applies reciprocally for τ i ), it can be written: 14
where P i , and P j are the probabilities of choosing origin I and destination j. Hence, these probabilities 16 represent representative traveler's demand for origins and destinations. However, the demand functions 17 for these probabilities are not explicitly defined, but result implicitly from the summation of alternative-18 specific probabilities P ij . Consequently, antiderivatives do not exist and integration cannot readily be 19 achieved, but it is necessary for deriving ( )
ΔE U . 20
For the solution of the integrals, it is of great importance whether the initial and final probabilities P i and 21 P j are equal or not. Generally, they are equal in the case of inelastic and unequal in the case of elastic 22 constraints. Next we shall derive the solution for the constant case through the example of The probabilities are obviously constant and accordingly independent from shadow prices. Hence there 27 are no formal interdependences of probabilities of the origins and the shadow prices. As a consequence, 28 the probabilities can be taken outside the integrals. Thus, the integration is path-independent because of 29 the independent integrability of all integration variables θ i . So we obtain: 30
Then the integration of the differentials dθ i provides the integration variables θ i . Next we insert the 1 bounds of integration and the solution for the inelastic constraint case is: 2
The probability for choosing origin i is defined by the ratio of total number of trips originating at zone i 4 and total demand. These numbers are known from the trip generation and it can be written: 5
This is an unambiguous solution and all relevant variables are given by the solved EVA MNL. 7
If destination probabilities change between initial and final state, we need another approach, since we 9 cannot take the probabilities outside the integral readily. So, in principal, it is necessary to integrate the 10 (unknown) functions of the resulting probabilities P j s. But we only have information about the P j s for the 11 two equilibrium (initial and final) states. Hence, we have to make an assumption about the shape of the 12 function in between. According to the RoH we assume a linear form. 13
With the assumption of a linear path of integration it can be written: 14
Now the integral can be solved analogically to the inelastic constraint case and we obtain: 16
Replacing probabilities by total numbers of trips gives: 18
Again, all necessary variables are given by the EVA MNL. 20
Now we are able to formulate the change in expected maximum utility of a representative traveler. For the 21 example under consideration with one set of inelastic constraints for origins and one set of elastic 22 constraints for destinations, we obtain: 23 
Obviously the logsum difference is corrected by the influence of the shadow prices. Furthermore, it is 1 crucial to note that if shadow prices are unchanged, no correction is necessary. The last two terms cancel 2 out and the logsum difference provides the change in consumer surplus. That is the case when generally 3 no constraints occur or when constraints are only complied in the initial case. Then, in the final state 4 initial shadow prices are considered as additional origin, destination or mode utilities. 5 Finally, with
Total change in consumer surplus 9
So far, we have derived the change in expected maximum utility of a representative traveler. Now we 10 move on to the solution for the needed (total) change in consumer surplus. For this purpose ( ) ΔE U has to 11 be monetized by -β c (negative marginal utility of the cost variable) and multiplied by the total number of 12 trips T. In case of T 0 = T 1 , i.e. total demand is fixed and no project-induced new generated trips occur, we 13 have: 14
The logsum difference cancels out, since, as already partly shown in equation (13) 
and log(1) = 0. Hence, the change in total consumer surplus results from the change in shadow prices. 18 However, these changes are caused by changes of observable costs and (destination) utilities, therefore 19 the project-induced transport user benefits are indirectly measured by this approach. If, for example, a 20 cost reduction for trips originating in zone i occurs, this zone attains better accessibility. As a result of this, 21 and under the assumption of respecting constraints, the shadow price of this zone decreases. Conversely, 22 if shadow prices increase, negative benefits result. Hence, benefits changes are based on changes in 23 accessibility of zones. 24
It might be possible that a transport investment or policy leads to a change in the total number of trips and 25 it is T 0 ≠ T 1 . In this case an issue arises comparable to the shown changing probabilities of destinations. 26 For calculating transport user benefits, we have to take into account the shape of the overall demand curve 27 between T 0 and T 1 , but we do not have information about that shape and only know total demand for the 28 two equilibrium (initial and final) states. Hence, again, we have to make an assumption about it and use a 29 linear form. Then, ( ) ΔE U (equation (32)) has to be multiplied by (T 0 + T 1 ) / 2 and it is: 30 ( ) ( ) ( )
This equation provides the universal solution for calculating transport user benefits based on the MNL -32 with or without constraints. If no constraints and shadow prices occur, the logsum difference multiplied 33 by the (mean) total demand provides the change in consumer surplus. The same applies to the constrainedcase, if shadow prices are the same in the initial and final state. In these cases the last two terms on the 1 right side cancel out. In contrast, if constraints are respected in both calculations, the derived adjustment 2 of the logsum difference has to be taken into account. Then, under consideration of the mathematical 3 simplification in equation (34), it can be written 4 ( ) ( ) ( )
If shadow prices of single dimensions (e.g., destinations) are equal in the initial and final state, the 6 corresponding correction term disappears, while the others still apply. 7
The meanings of the benefit terms in equation (35) are the same as explained for the case with fixed total 8 demand. However, the first term enters as an additional benefit term that represents the positive benefits 9 of new generated trips. Negative impacts of these additional trips (like competition for destinations) are 10 taken into account by origin and destination specific shadow prices. That is, if new trips occur due to 11 transport investment, shadow prices decrease less than without these additional trips. 12
EXAMPLE 13
The basic principle of the developed approach can be illustrated by a simple synthetic example, which is 14 defined by 15
• five travel zones 16
• one homogenous group of persons 17
• inelastic origin and destination constraints 18
More realistic examples and case studies will be discussed in the future. However, a simple example such 19 as this might be helpful for initial understanding. 20 shadow prices -and therefore a positive difference -induce positive benefits. 8 A reduction of shadow prices is primary achieved for traffic zones that are directly affected by the cost 9 changes (here: zones 1 and 4). The reason is that the accessibility of these zones has been improved and 10 transport users need not be so "forced" to choose these zones (for satisfying constraints) by shadow prices. 11
However, all constraints have to be satisfied in the final state, too. Therefore, all other zones are affected 12 indirectly by the cost changes. Although their accessibilities have not changed, these zones loose 13 attractiveness compared to zones 1 and 4 and shadow prices increase for satisfying constraints. 14 The change in consumer surplus results from shadow price differences and the total numbers of trips, and 15 it is calculated for each zone. However, it is important to note that only the sum over all zones is 16 interpretable as the transport users benefit measure needed for evaluating transport investments by CBA, 17 because the single values are only "proxies" for defining benefits of "real affected" transport users. Now the result of the adjusted logsum difference approach should be compared with the widely used 3 traditional RoH, whose applicability for travel demand models with constraints has recently been proved 4 (Winkler, 2015) . The RoH is an approximation of the user benefits and it depends on the change in costs 5
and trips for each origin-destination-relation: 6 As we can see in equation (37) and TABLE 4, transport user benefits only occur for relations with 8 changing costs. 9
The comparison of the results shows that the approximate solution (RoH) overestimates the exact measure 10 (adjusted logsum difference) with 17%. However, the difference between the RoH and an exact measure 11 (logsum or adjusted logsum differences) can be positive or negative and it strongly depends on the 12 amount of the cost changes and the shape of the underlying demand function (Ma et al., 2015) . Therefore, 13 it is recommended to use the exact measure for deriving transport user benefits. 14 0,00 0,00 0,00 12,38 0,00 2 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 3 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 4 15,62 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 $ 28,00
CONCLUSIONS 1
In this paper we have seen -by the example of the EVA model -that multiple-constrained travel demand 2 models are expressible in terms of a MNL. This is the basis for an economic analysis of these models and 3 the starting point for the derivation of a transport user benefit measure that is usually needed for 4 evaluating transport investments by CBA. For this purpose the change in consumer surplus is often used. 5
This measure is provided by the MNL and called "logsum difference", which is a very practical and 6 mathematically exact approach. However, the logsum difference fails for travel demand models with 7 constraints and only approximations can be used. 8
For this reason we have derived an approach that adjusts the logsum difference for travel demand models 9 with two sets of constraints. This approach provides the change in consumer surplus for models with 10 different constraints (elastic and/or inelastic). Furthermore, it contains the logsum difference for the MNL 11 without constraints as an exception. For the sake of clarity, the analyses presented have been focused on 12 the case with inelastic constraints for the origin and elastic constraints for destination choice. Other cases 13 can be analogically derived, but equation (35) provides the general solution for the change in consumer 14 surplus that covers all possible combinations of constraints. 15
The approach derived is suitable for measuring benefits caused by changing costs, but also for changing 16 attractions. Attraction changes can be expressed by different origin or destination utilities or by a changed 17
given total number of trips originating at or attracted to zones. Hence, it is possible to evaluate short-run 18 and long-run impacts of transport investments and the derived approach can be used for a wide range of 19 evaluations. 20
